Fixed‐Rate Mortgages, Labor Markets, and Efficiency
研究固定利率抵押贷款与浮动利率抵押贷款的选择如何影响劳动力市场效率，发现固定利率贷款会因利率锁定阻碍工人跨区域流动，导致效率损失，并量化了消除固定利率贷款并提供浮动利率保险的福利效应。
Abstract The paper studies the effects of mortgage choices between fixed‐rate mortgages (FRMs) and adjustable‐rate mortgages (ARMs) on labor market efficiency. FRMs provide insurance for risk‐averse borrowers in the sense that they pay the same rate over time and are not subject to uncertain spot market rates. FRMs, however, discourage borrowers from moving to other regions despite better employment opportunities, as they terminate the FRM contracts in order to move and their new loan interests may be higher. As FRM‐borrowers do not move to other regions due to the interest lock‐ins, entrepreneurs in other regions lose the potential surpluses from productive matches that would have occurred between borrowers‐workers and entrepreneurs. Borrowers ignore this negative externality they impose on the entrepreneurs when choosing their mortgages, and too many borrowers choose FRMs relative to the efficient level. If FRMs are eliminated and ARM‐insurance (that protects ARM‐borrowers against uncertain adjustable interest rates) is created, it will improve efficiency. The paper also assesses quantitatively the welfare effects of eliminating FRMs and providing ARM‐insurance.