Efficient and Incentive‐Compatible Liver Exchange
研究了肝脏交换的市场设计问题，提出一个既符合个人理性、帕累托高效又激励相容的机制，模拟显示该机制能增加超过30%的移植数量并提高更安全的左叶移植比例。
Liver exchange has been practiced in small numbers, mainly to overcome blood‐type incompatibility between patients and their living donors. A donor can donate either his smaller left lobe or the larger right lobe, although the former option is safer. Despite its elevated risk, right‐lobe transplantation is often utilized due to size‐compatibility requirement with the patient. We model liver exchange as a market‐design problem, focusing on logistically simpler two‐way exchanges, and introduce an individually rational, Pareto‐efficient, and incentive‐compatible mechanism. Construction of this mechanism requires novel technical tools regarding bilateral exchanges under partial‐order‐induced preferences. Through simulations we show that not only can liver exchange increase the number of transplants by more than 30%, it can also increase the share of the safer left‐lobe transplants.