Do Debt Covenants Constrain Borrowings Prior to Violation? Evidence from SFAS 160
利用SFAS 160会计准则变化作为外生冲击，研究发现该准则放松了债务契约的严格程度，使得接近违约但财务健康的公司增加了债务水平，并提高了投资对Q的敏感性。
ABSTRACT Prior evidence shows a reduction in leverage after covenant violations, but we do not know whether covenants affect leverage before they are violated. In this study, we use an exogenous accounting-based shock to debt covenants that relaxed covenant tightness (SFAS 160) and examine whether covenants constrain leverage for borrowers that are close to violation, even when the borrower is financially healthy. We find that SFAS 160 increased debt levels in firms that were close to violation. This increase in debt was driven by financially healthy firms, suggesting the likelihood of future covenant violations could impede borrowing by firms. We also find an increase in investment sensitivity to Q after SFAS 160 in firms close to violation, suggesting the additional debt was used to make legitimate investments. Because SFAS 160 was passed in the midst of the financial crisis, it is difficult to generalize our findings to more normal financial periods. JEL Classifications: G01; G30; G31; G33; M21; M41.