PRODUCT CHOICE UNDER GOVERNMENT REGULATION: THE CASE OF CHILE'S PRIVATIZED PENSION SYSTEM
研究了智利养老金体系中最低回报率监管的影响，发现该监管导致对风险投资的需求增加、管理费上升，但也促进了账户余额积累，减少了对政府支持的依赖。
Abstract Chile's individual retirement pension accounts system has been a model for many countries. To limit the riskiness of pension investments, Chile required pension fund managers to deliver returns that are not more than 2% below the industry average. We develop and estimate a model of the pension investment market that allows us to study the impact of minimum return regulation. We find that the regulation leads to higher demand for risky investments, creates incentives to offer riskier portfolios, and leads to higher management fees. However, the regulation also stimulates balance accumulation that ultimately reduces the reliance on government support.