Illegal immigration, unemployment, and multiple destinations
构建了一个包含均衡失业的多国非法移民模型，分析两种地理情形下边境管控与内部执法的效率，发现均衡边境管控不足而内部执法有效，对研究移民政策的经济学者有参考价值。
Abstract We develop a multicountry model of illegal immigration with equilibrium unemployment. Two geographic cases are considered. One has two destinations adjacent to the source country while the other has just one destination country adjacent to it. In both cases, the equilibrium border control proves insufficient compared with the joint optimum, calling for enforcement by federal authorities. Absent such authorities, delegating border control to the country with a larger native labor force can improve each destination country’s welfare. In contrast, the equilibrium internal enforcement policy is efficient, obviating enforcement by supranational authorities.