Corporate Governance and Financial Peer Effects
研究发现，资本结构选择中的同伴效应仅存在于外部公司治理较弱的企业，管理者可能通过模仿来避免优化财务政策的努力和市场监督，但模仿会导致更高的融资成本和更低的未来盈利能力。
Abstract Growing evidence suggests that managers select financial policies partially by mimicking policies of peer firms. We find that these peer effects in capital structure choice are unique to firms operating under weak external corporate governance. Cross‐sectional tests suggest that this finding is best explained by a quiet life hypothesis in which managers may be able to avoid the effort required to optimize financial policies and the scrutiny of market participants. Leverage ratios of mimicking firms display less sensitivity to a profitability shock. Finally, mimicking correlates to higher financing costs and lower future profitability, especially if it results in high leverage.