Analysis of Stigma and Bank Credit Provision
研究了银行接受政府救助带来的污名如何影响其申请救助的决策以及作为金融中介的放贷能力，发现污名阻碍了救助目标并减缓信贷供给。
Abstract Bank rescue programs are designed to provide assistance to struggling financial intermediaries during financial crises. A complicating factor is that participating banks are often stigmatized by accepting assistance from the government. This paper investigates stigma in two ways: (i) it examines how stigma changes a bank's decision to seek assistance from the rescue program, and (ii) it analyzes how stigma affects a bank's ability to operate as a financial intermediary using a joint model for bank‐level application, approval, and lending decisions. The empirical results indicate that stigma hinders the objectives of the rescue program and slows the production of credit.