Financial Crises, Dollarization, and Lending of Last Resort in Open Economies
提出一个理论，认为新兴市场中的负债美元化源于国内储蓄者的保险动机，并发现危机后对借款人的支持反而能降低事前借外币的动机。
Foreign currency debt is considered a source of financial instability in emerging markets. We propose a theory in which liability dollarization arises from an insurance motive of domestic savers. Since financial crises are associated to depreciations, savers ask for a risk premium when saving in local currency. This force makes domestic currency debt expensive, and incentivizes borrowers to issue foreign currency debt. Providing ex post support to borrowers can alleviate the effect of the crisis on savers’ income, lowering their demand for insurance, and, surprisingly, it can reduce ex ante incentives to borrow in foreign currency.