Executive compensation and cash contributions to defined benefit pension plans
研究发现CEO薪酬越高，企业向固定收益养老金计划的现金缴款越少，且当薪酬与经营现金流挂钩时这一效应更强，但更透明的信息披露能缓解该现象。
Abstract Cash contributions to defined benefit pension (DB) plans reduce cash flows from operations without directly affecting the current year's net income. We utilize this unique setting to investigate how managerial incentives to report higher cash flows from operations, executive compensation in particular, affect contributions. Using a comprehensive dataset of DB plan contributions, we find that firms with higher chief executive officer (CEO) compensation contribute less to DB plans, consistent with managers benefiting from lower pension contributions. Results are stronger when CEO compensation is directly linked to cash flows from operations or when CEO compensation is more sensitive to cash flows from operations. We also find enhanced disclosure and more transparent reporting under the recent pension accounting regime mitigates the negative association between executive compensation and cash contributions.