Multitasking and Subjective Performance Evaluations: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in a Bank
研究了当员工从事多项任务时，让主管获取客观绩效信息对激励的影响。通过银行实地实验发现，提供客观数据能提升努力和利润，尤其在大型分支机构和低利润产品中效果更显著。
We study the incentive effects of granting supervisors access to objective performance information when agents work on multiple tasks. We first analyze a formal model showing that incentives are lower powered when supervisors have no access to objective measures but assess performance subjectively by gathering information. This incentive loss is more pronounced when the span of control is larger and incentives are distorted toward more profitable tasks. We then investigate a field experiment conducted in a bank. In the treatment group, managers obtained access to objective performance measures, which raised efforts and profits. We find that the effects are driven by larger branches and lower margin products. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.