Tax Reporting Behavior Under Audit Certainty
利用美国国税局协调行业案例项目的数据，研究审计确定性对企业税务报告行为的影响，发现进入该项目后企业税款支付未显著变化，但改变了管理者对未来税款的预期。
ABSTRACT This study uses a confidential data set of firms assigned to the Internal Revenue Service's Coordinated Industry Case (CIC) program to examine the effect of audit certainty on firms' tax reporting behavior. We first model the determinants of assignment to the program. Although the ability and incentive to avoid taxes are related to CIC assignment, we find that the IRS assigns firms primarily based on size and complexity. We then test whether audit certainty has a detectable effect on tax payments. Our results show that tax payments do not change when firms enter the CIC program, suggesting the CIC program does not have higher deterrence or enforcement effects relative to the IRS's standard selection and audit process for large corporations not included in the CIC program. However, supplemental analysis suggests that audit certainty does alter managers' expectations regarding future tax payments. Our paper provides new empirical evidence on the strategic game between the taxpayer and the tax authority and has important implications for tax authorities as they consider the costs and benefits of certain audit programs.