Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks
研究了国家监管机构处置全球银行的方式，指出单一入口处置在跨境转移不对称或过大时面临实施困难，而多入口处置更为稳健。
We study the resolution of global banks by national regulators. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is shared across jurisdictions, is efficient but faces implementation constraints. First, when expected transfers across jurisdictions are too asymmetric, national regulators fail to set up SPOE resolution ex ante. Second, when required ex post transfers are too large, national regulators ring-fence assets instead of cooperating in SPOE resolution. In this case, a multiple-point-of-entry (MPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is preassigned, is more robust. Our analysis highlights a fundamental link between efficient bank resolution, the operational structures, risks, and incentives of global banks.