Matching with Moral Hazard: Assigning Attorneys to Poor Defendants
将指派律师给贫困被告的问题建模为匹配问题，发现稳定匹配会加剧律师的道德风险，使被告处境更差，而随机匹配在特定条件下更有效率。
We model the problem of assigning counsel to poor defendants as a matching problem. A novel aspect of this matching problem is the moral hazard component on the part of counsel. Within the model, we show that holding the total expenditure for counsel fixed and changing the matching procedure to accommodate defendants’ and attorneys’ preferences, i.e., switch from random matching to stable matching, defendants become worse off because a stable matching exacerbates the moral hazard problem on the part of counsel. In addition, we show that under suitable conditions random matching is the efficient way to allocate defendants to counsel.