Evaluating the role of capital controls and monetary policy in emerging market crises
研究了新兴市场经济体在突然停止型金融危机中，最优货币政策与资本管制如何互动，发现政策承诺在浮动汇率下重要，宏观审慎政策在固定汇率下更积极。
This paper explores the interactive role of optimal monetary policy and capital controls in dealing with ‘sudden-stop’ financial crises in emerging market economies. The model features collateral constraints embedding pecuniary externalities, as well as nominal rigidities in prices and wages. We explore the role of policy commitment and macro-prudential motives in the design of optimal monetary and capital market responses to crises, under alternative exchange rate regimes. We find that policy commitment is very important under flexible exchange rates, but commitment (to the path of capital taxes) is only of minor benefit under an exchange rate peg. As regards macro-prudential policy, we find the exact opposite. Under floating exchange rates, the optimal policy has almost no macro-prudential elements. On the other hand, when authorities are constrained by an exchange rate peg, macro-prudential policy is used aggressively as part of an optimal policy framework. An important additional finding is that the direction of capital controls is different under a fixed relative to a flexible exchange rate. With flexible exchange rates, policy makers impose inflow taxes immediately at the onset of a crisis. Under pegged exchange rates, they will impose capital inflow subsidies.