When Does the Family Govern the Family Firm?
研究发现挪威家族企业中79%由家族同时担任CEO和董事长，家族持股越多、企业越小越盈利越风险低时参与治理越多，且业绩对参与的促进作用比参与对业绩的促进作用强一倍。
We find that the controlling family holds both the chief executive officer and chair positions in 79% of Norwegian family firms. The family holds more governance positions when it owns large stakes in small, profitable, low-risk firms. This result suggests that the family trades off expected costs and benefits by conditioning participation intensity on observable firm characteristics. We find that the positive effect of performance on participation is twice as strong as the positive effect of participation on performance. The endogeneity of participation, therefore, should be carefully accounted for when analyzing the effect of family governance on the family firm’s behavior.