ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL SECURITY SURVIVORS INSURANCE
构建异质性代理人模型，分析社会保障遗属保险的影响，发现减少对受抚养子女的遗属福利会带来福利损失，而减少对老年配偶的福利则产生福利增益。
Abstract This article develops a heterogeneous agents model to analyze the effects of Social Security survivors insurance. The model features a negative mortality–income gradient, asymmetric information of individual mortality rates, and a warm‐glow bequest motive that varies by age and family structure. The model matches life‐cycle changes in life insurance coverage and generates advantageous selection in the insurance market. For male agents, reducing survivors benefits for dependent children generates welfare losses, whereas reducing survivors benefits for aged spouses produces welfare gains. The opposing welfare results are explained by differences in the timing of benefits and in the funding cost.