Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
研究了当部分参与者诚实（在结果无差异时倾向说真话）时，社会选择规则在强纳什均衡下可实施的条件，提出了弱帕累托支配条件，并应用于匹配和讨价还价问题。
In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be implementable in strong Nash equilibrium in the presence of partially honest agents, that is, agents who break ties in favourof a truthful message when they face indifference between outcomes. In this way, we achieve a relaxation in the condition of Korpela (2013), namely the Axiom of Sufficient Reason. Our new condition, Weak Pareto Dominance, is shown to be sufficient along with Weak Pareto Optimality and Universally Worst Alternative. We finally provide applications of our result in pure matching and bargaining environments.