Bonuses and Promotion Tournaments: Theory and Evidence
研究了晋升锦标赛中工资与奖金的区别，提出一个结合经典与市场锦标赛理论的新模型，并用芬兰企业数据验证了奖金决定的理论预测。
Abstract Standard models of promotion tournaments do not distinguish between wages and bonuses and thus cannot explain variation in the use of bonuses. We combine classic and market-based tournament theories to develop a model in which wages and bonuses serve distinctly different roles. We use this model to derive testable predictions which we test employing both a single firm data set and a data set encompassing a large segment of the Finnish economy. Our empirical analysis supports the testable predictions and shows that our theoretical approach better matches the data than alternative theories of bonus determination based on arguments already in the literature.