Ambiguity Aversion Decreases the Impact of Partial Insurance: Evidence from African Farmers
研究发现，模糊厌恶的农民难以评估部分保险（如降雨保险）是否真的降低了风险，这削弱了保险促进新技术采用和生产率增长的作用，并用马拉维和肯尼亚的随机实验数据验证了理论。
Abstract Indemnifying smallholder farmers against crop loss is thought to play an important role in encouraging the adoption of new technologies and facilitating productivity growth, but to be infeasible due to information problems. Consequently there is interest in developing alternative, partial, insurance products. Examples include rainfall insurance and the limited liability inherent in credit contracts. I argue that although these products may reduce information asymmetry, ambiguity averse farmers struggle to assess whether the contracts reduce risk. This problem is most pronounced when the production technology is ambiguous, as is likely the case for new technologies. I formalize this argument and test the theory using data from two RCTs, conducted in Malawi and Kenya. Comparative statics from the theory are consistent with both sets of data, and I argue that income losses from ambiguity aversion may be substantial.