预留设计:意外后果与波士顿步行区名额的终结

Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston’s Walk Zones

Journal of Political Economy · 2018
被引 128
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

研究发现,在入学预留名额制度中,优先级顺序(即不同类型名额的填充顺序)与调整预留规模效果相当。基于波士顿公立学校数据,两者定量影响相似,而优先级意外削弱政策意图的透明度问题最终导致步行区预留名额被取消。

Abstract

We show that in the presence of admissions reserves, the effect of the precedence order (i.e., the order in which different types of seats are filled) is comparable to the effect of adjusting reserve sizes. Either lowering the precedence of reserve seats at a school or increasing the school’s reserve size weakly increases reserve-group assignment at that school. Using data from Boston Public Schools, we show that reserve and precedence adjustments have similar quantitative effects. Transparency about these issues—in particular, how precedence unintentionally undermined intended policy—led to the elimination of walk zone reserves in Boston’s public school match.

入学预留优先顺序预留规模步行区波士顿公立学校匹配