Revenue Guarantee Equivalence
研究了第一价格、第二价格和英式拍卖在固定竞拍者价值分布下的收益保证，发现对称关联模型中三种拍卖的收益保证等价，但考虑所有均衡或更一般信息模型时第一价格拍卖的收益保证更高。
We revisit the revenue comparison of standard auction formats, including first-price, second-price, and English auctions. We rank auctions according to their revenue guarantees, i.e., the greatest lower bound of revenue across all informational environments, where we hold fixed the distribution of bidders’ values. We conclude that if we restrict attention to the symmetric affiliated models of Milgrom and Weber (1982) and monotonic pure-strategy equilibria, first-price, second-price, and English auctions are revenue guarantee equivalent: they have the same revenue guarantee, which is equal to that of the first-price auction as characterized by Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2017). If we consider all equilibria or if we allow more general models of information, then first-price auctions have a greater revenue guarantee than all other auctions considered.