Housing Boom‐Bust Cycles and Asymmetric Macroprudential Policy
论证了偶尔有约束力的借贷限制是非线性的来源，需要非对称宏观审慎政策来应对，相比对称规则，非对称规则能更有效降低产出和通胀尾部风险，并给货币政策带来正外部性。
Abstract In this paper, I argue that occasionally binding borrowing constraints are a source of nonlinearity that warrant an appropriate nonlinear macroprudential policy response. Nonlinear policy responses likely better capture the spirit of macroprudential policy. I show that an asymmetric macroprudential policy rule, which lowers the borrowing limit more aggressively during credit booms, obtains better economic outcomes compared to an optimized symmetric rule that is typically studied in the literature. An asymmetric policy response reduces output and inflation tail risks, generating not only better economic stabilization but also positive externalities to monetary policy.