Founder-Controlled Firms and R&D Investments: New Evidence From Canada
研究了加拿大上市公司中创始人控制的企业在研发投资上的行为差异，发现只有无超额投票权的单一创始人企业研发投入更高。
Our study investigates the R&D investment behavior of founder-controlled Canadian listed firms. We use De Massis et al.’s model of the sufficiency conditions of ability and willingness and adapt it to predict investments in R&D. As founder-controlled firms are heterogeneous in nature, we distinguish four categories: lone founder firms and family founder firms with and without excess voting rights. In line with our predictions, we find that only lone founder firms without excess voting rights have both the ability and the willingness to invest in R&D and so they invest more in R&D than their counterparts.