SELLING A LEMON UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY
研究卖方在拥有产品质量私人信息且面临需求不确定时的定价策略，发现需求不确定性对低质量卖方的收益和定价策略有重要影响，取决于买方是否了解需求状态。
Abstract We consider a seller who has private information about the quality of her good but is uncertain about buyer arrivals. Assuming that the high‐quality seller insists on a price, we show that the low‐quality seller's surplus and pricing strategy crucially depend on buyers' knowledge about the demand state. If they are also uncertain about demand, then demand uncertainty increases the low‐quality seller's expected payoff, and her optimal strategy is to lower the price after some time. If buyers know the demand state, then demand uncertainty does not affect the low‐quality seller's payoff, but she must employ a sophisticated pricing strategy.