Optimal Tenurial Contracts Under Both Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
研究了垄断地主与有限责任佃农在逆向选择和道德风险并存时的最优租佃契约，发现佃农外部选择权影响契约类型，且外部选择权提高不必然增加佃农努力。
Abstract This paper determines the optimal tenurial contract between a monopoly landlord and a tenant protected by limited liability under both adverse selection (based on the tenant's ability) and moral hazard (based on the tenant's choice of effort). We identify different optimal contracts depending on the tenant's outside option. For intermediate values, there is a threshold of tenant ability depending on the outside option level below which the optimal contract is a separating sharecropping contract, and a pooling one otherwise. We also find that an increase in the outside option does not monotonically increase the tenant's optimal effort.