Upping the Ante: The Equilibrium Effects of Unconditional Grants to Private Schools
实验向村庄私立学校发放无条件现金拨款，发现拨款增加入学率和收入，但只有所有学校都获得拨款时才能提高考试成绩，说明市场竞争可激励质量提升。
We assess whether financing can help private schools, which now account for one-third of primary school enrollment in low- and middle-income countries. Our experiment allocated unconditional cash grants to either one (L) or all (H) private schools in a village. In both arms, enrollment and revenues increased, leading to above-market returns. However, test scores increased only in H schools, accompanied by higher fees, and a greater focus on teachers. We provide a model demonstrating that market forces can provide endogenous incentives to increase quality and increased financial saturation can be used to leverage competition, generating socially desirable outcomes.