Games of Love and Hate
研究了基于收益外部性的策略互动，提出“爱与恨博弈”模型，证明其所有均衡都是帕累托最优的，适合对博弈论和福利经济学感兴趣的学者。
A strategic situation with payoff-based externalities is one in which a player’s payoff depends on her own action and others’ payoffs. We place restrictions on the resulting interdependent utility system that generate a standard normal form, referred to as a “game of love and hate.” Our central theorem states that every equilibrium of a game of love and hate is Pareto optimal. While externalities are restricted to flow only through payoffs, there are no other constraints: they could be positive or negative or of varying sign. We examine the philosophical implications of the restrictions that underlie this theorem.