Progressive Tax and Inequality in a Unionized Economy*
构建了一个工会化经济体的异质性代理人内生增长模型，研究劳动和资本收入累进税对不平等和增长的影响，发现降低劳动累进税可同时减少不平等和促进增长，而资本累进税则存在权衡。
Abstract In this paper, we develop a heterogeneous‐agent, endogenous growth model of a unionized economy with distinct progressive tax schedules on labor and capital income. With time preference heterogeneity, the effective labor force, balanced growth, and income inequality are endogenously determined, and these interact with each other. A reduction in the degree of progressive labor tax yields a “double‐dividend” in terms of reducing income inequality and boosting economic growth, while capital income progressivity displays the usual growth–inequality trade‐off. Particularly, the double‐dividend effect becomes more pronounced when unionization is declined or trade unions become more wage‐oriented, leading to the so‐called “Cheshire cat” phenomenon.