IMPLICIT BANK DEBT GUARANTEES: COSTS, BENEFITS AND RISKS
分析了市场对政府隐性担保银行债务的预期，探讨了通过增强银行实力、改进处置框架和让债权人分担损失来降低担保价值的政策效果，发现行动比言辞更有效。
Abstract The expectation by market participants that public authorities might bailout the creditors of banks that are considered too important for financial system stability or another reason to be allowed to fail, is commonly referred to as an implicit guarantee. Public authorities do not have any explicit commitment to intervene; they may even honestly state that they not want to do so ex ante , but may feel compelled to do so ex post . A declared policy aim is to limit the value of implicit guarantees by making banks stronger, more easily resolvable in case of distress, as well as by imposing extra charges that rise as banks become more systemically important. As part of the latter approach, globally systemically important banks are identified and subjected to more costly and intrusive regulation. There is little evidence that specific approach has been successful so far. There is some evidence that the introduction of new resolution frameworks has been helpful, while the use of newly available resolution tools and the involvement of bank creditors in the burden sharing associated with bank failure resolution has significantly reduced the value of implicit bank debt guarantees, where it occurred. In that sense, actions speak louder than words.