Market Reactions to Export Subsidies
通过分析1997年欧盟向WTO投诉美国出口补贴事件前后美国出口企业股价变化，发现股价下跌幅度与补贴价值正相关，且高利润企业跌幅更大，支持战略贸易理论。
The authors are grateful to Naomi Feldman for excellent research assistance and David Weinstein for expert data guidance; to them and to seminar participants for helpful comments on earlier drafts; and to the Lois and Bruce Zenkel Research Fund at the University of Michigan and the Division of Research at Harvard Business School for financial support. Market Reactions to Export Subsidies This paper analyzes the economic impact of export subsidies by investigating stock price reactions to a critical event in 1997. On November 18, 1997, the European Union announced its intention to file a complaint before the World Trade Organization (WTO), arguing that the United States provided American exporters illegal subsidies by permitting them to use Foreign Sales Corporations to exempt a fraction of export profits from taxation. Share prices of American exporters fell sharply on this news, and its implication that the WTO might force the United States to eliminate the subsidy. The share price declines were largest for exporters whose tax situations made the threatened export subsidy particularly valuable. Share prices of exporters with high profit margins also declined markedly on November 18, 1997, suggesting that the export subsidies were most valuable to firms earning market rents. This last evidence is consistent with strategic trade models in which export subsidies improve the competitive positions of firms in imperfectly competitive markets.