Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations
质疑公司治理理论中极端所有权结构二分法的实证有效性，发现欧洲三分之一的上市公司有多个大股东，其市场价值与单一或分散持股公司不同，且估值与现金流权分布的关系符合理论预测。
Abstract: The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.