Comparing open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions*
利用美国林务局木材拍卖数据，研究密封投标与公开拍卖在投标人参与、资源配置和收入上的差异，并构建模型解释这些差异，为拍卖设计提供参考。
We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions. Using data from the U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of systematic effects: sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders, shift the allocation toward these bidders, and can also generate higher revenue. A private value auction model with endogenous participation can account for these qualitative effects of auction format. We estimate the model's parameters and show that it can explain the quantitative effects as well. We then use the model to assess bidder competitiveness, which has important consequences for auction design.