Holdup by Junior Claimholders: Evidence from the Mortgage Market
研究发现，当抵押贷款服务商同时持有同一房产的次级债权时，会延迟处理优先贷款违约，并倾向于选择保全自身期权价值的处置方式，如贷款修改或软性止赎。
When borrowers are delinquent, senior debtholders prefer liquidation, whereas junior debtholders prefer to maintain their option value by delaying resolution or modifying the loan. In the mortgage market, a conflict of interest (“holdup”) arises when servicers of securitized senior liens are also the owners of the junior liens on the same property. We show that holdup servicers are able to delay action on the first-lien mortgage. When they do act, servicers are more likely to choose resolutions that maintain their option value, favoring modification and soft foreclosures over outright foreclosures. Holdup behavior is more likely to result in borrower self-curing.