Least‐Present‐Value‐of‐Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising
指出固定期限合同不能最优分配高速公路需求风险，提出最低收入现值拍卖机制，通过竞标收入现值而非通行费或期限来优化风险分担，并证明其能带来显著福利提升。
In this paper we show that fixed-term contracts, which are commonly used to franchise highways, do not allocate demand risk optimally. We characterize the optimal risk-sharing contract and show that it can be implemented with a fairly straightforward mechanisma least-present-value-of-revenue auction. Instead of bidding on tolls (or franchise lengths), as in the case of fixed-term franchises, in an LPVR auction the bidding variable is the present value of toll revenues. The lowest bid wins and the franchise ends when that amount has been collected. We also show that the welfare gains that can be attained by replacing fixed-term auctions with LPVR auctions are substantial.