Product safety, contracts, and liability
研究企业向异质消费者销售危险产品时，如何通过合同分配事故责任来影响安全投资，发现当消费者净收益随类型递增时企业会推卸责任并投资不足，需要法律干预。
Abstract A firm sells a dangerous product to heterogeneous consumers. Higher consumer types suffer accidents more often but may enjoy higher gross benefits. The firm invests resources to reduce the frequency of accidents. When the consumer's net benefit function (gross benefits minus expected harms) is decreasing in consumer type, the firm contractually accepts liability for accident losses and invests efficiently. When the consumer's net benefit function is increasing in consumer type, the firm contractually disclaims liability and underinvests. Legal interventions, including products liability and limits on contractual waivers and disclaimers, are necessary to raise the level of product safety.