The Optimal Level of Social Security Benefits
推导了社会保障福利的最优水平，平衡了对未充分储蓄者的保护与扭曲经济行为的福利成本，主要考虑对私人储蓄的扭曲，并分析了三种基本情形。
The optimal level of Social Security benefits depends on balancing the protection that these benefits offer to those who have not provided adequately for their own old age against the welfare costs of distorting economic behavior. The primary such cost is the distortion in private saving. The present paper derives the level of Social Security benefits that is optimal in three basic cases. In the first section of the paper, the optimal level of benefits is derived for an economy in which all individuals do not anticipate retirement at all and therefore do not save. The second and third sections then derive the optimal benefits for economies with two different definitions of attitudes toward retirement and saving.