Accelerating Inflation, Technological Innovation, and the Decreasing Effectiveness of Banking Regulation
用监管辩证模型解释1960-70年代美国存款机构与市场演变，认为技术和市场环境加速变化及不确定性增加，使银行管理者比监管机构更具适应效率，导致传统监管被创新所压倒。
To explain the evolution of U.S. deposit institutions and markets in the 1960sand 1970s, we feed into the regulatory dialectic assumptions about the objectives of federal banking regulation and about outside forces that disturb the adjustment process. The disturbing exogenous forces are accelerating change in the technological and market environment of commercial banking and increasing uncertainty concerning the future speed of enviromental change. We hypothesize that, in the face of these environmental changes, the adaptive efficiency shown on average by deposit-institution managers is greater than that shown by managers of the several competing banking agencies. Incorporating this differential adaptive capacity into the regulatory dialectic helps us to understand how increases in the pace of environmental change and in the degree of environmental uncertainty led regulatee responses to come more quickly and regulatory responses to come more slowly. The bottom line is that, when the environment changes rapidly and becomes more uncertain, traditional forms of U.S. banking regulation can be overwhelmed by technological and regulation-induced innovation.