Revenue‐Sharing Contracts under Demand Uncertainty in Shopping Center
研究了购物中心开发商在需求不确定下，对大小零售商采用固定租金加销售提成的两部定价合同，发现开发商对大零售商收取较低提成比例或较高固定租金，且预期利润随不确定性增加。
Abstract This article investigates shopping center rent contracts that have a two‐part tariff structure: charging a fixed rent plus a percentage of sales. We consider a game‐theoretic model, wherein a shopping center developer offers different contracts for two types of retailers: large and small. The retailers face demand uncertainties. We show the developer offers a lower percentage fee for the large retailer. Alternatively, it offers a higher fixed fee for the large retailer, unless the small retailer faces largely uncertain demand. The developer's expected profit increases with the demand uncertainty, which would suggest the developer should assemble nearly homogeneous retailers.