Does the Mandatory Bid Rule Add Value to Target Shareholders?
研究了强制要约规则（让所有股东以同等条件参与收购）对目标公司公告回报的影响，利用15个欧洲国家逐步采用该规则进行双重差分分析，发现规则变化提高了目标回报。
Abstract I investigate whether implementation of the mandatory bid rule—the rule that grants all shareholders the right to participate in a takeover transaction at equal terms—affects target announcement returns. I use a difference‐in‐differences approach and the staggered adoption of the rule across 15 European countries. I find that the rule change leads to higher target returns. In full transactions, better accounting standards and shareholder protection norms of the acquirer leads to higher target returns. In majority transactions, greater value transfer from acquirers with weak accounting standards leads to higher target returns. I find weak evidence of overpayment by acquirers.