Price Discrimination, Copyright Law, and Technological Innovation: Evidence from the Introduction of DVDs
研究美国版权法如何限制直接价格歧视，企业如何通过间接价格歧视应对，并利用VHS和DVD发行数据验证理论预测，发现间接价格歧视对消费者有利但损害辅助零售商。
U. S. copyright law effectively prevents direct price discrimination for copyright holders that sell to different markets. In response, these firms can engage in indirect price discrimination. I derive theoretical predictions about the use of indirect price discrimination, and I analyze how optimal pricing strategies differ for different products. Using data on VHS and DVD movie distribution, I find that firms' pricing choices are consistent with the predictions of theory and that firms' use of indirect price discrimination benefits consumers (but harms ancillary retailers). Finally, I examine what optimal pricing strategies might look like in a legal environment that permits direct price discrimination.