When Do Powerful Stakeholders Give Managers the Latitude to Balance All Stakeholders’ Interests?
研究探讨了当利益相关者拥有高谈判权力时，他们在什么条件下会允许企业管理者平衡所有利益相关者的利益，而非只满足自身利益。基于开明自利和公平文献，识别了五个动机驱动因素，并分析了企业利益相关者策略与权力方价值分配行为的内生关系。
Research in instrumental stakeholder theory often discusses the benefits of a stakeholder strategy that balances all stakeholders’ interests as if the firm’s managers were not constrained much in choosing a strategy. Yet, through their value appropriation behavior, stakeholders with high bargaining power can significantly constrain managers’ choices. Our objective is, therefore, to understand when powerful stakeholders give managers the latitude to balance all stakeholders’ interests, rather than forcing them to satisfy primarily their own interests. Building on enlightened self-interest and the justice literature, we identify five motivational drivers that help explain powerful stakeholders’ value appropriation behavior. We next explore the endogenous relationship between the stakeholder strategy adopted by the firm and its effect on powerful stakeholders’ value appropriation behavior. This article complements instrumental stakeholder theory by looking at powerful stakeholders’ motivation to exercise their bargaining power, and in so doing brings powerful stakeholders’ moral responsibility in the treatment of weak stakeholders to the forefront.