Bounded Rationality and Bounded Reliability: A Study of Nonfamily Managers’ Entrepreneurial Behavior in Family Firms
运用交易成本经济学，解释家族企业中家族与非家族经理的个体创业行为差异，发现非家族经理创业行为较低，尤其在创始人离开后，并探讨了监控、激励、分配公平等因素如何促进其创业行为。
We use transaction cost economics to explain the individual-level entrepreneurial behavior of family and nonfamily managers in family firms. We argue that nonfamily managers exhibit lower entrepreneurial behavior than family managers, particularly after the founder’s departure from the business. Moreover, we identify an expanded set of factors through which family firms can facilitate nonfamily managers’ entrepreneurial behavior, including monitoring, incentives, distributive justice, access to the top management, and job control perceptions. We test these hypotheses in a sample of 296 family firm managers, contributing new insights on nonfamily managers and corporate entrepreneurship in family firms.