A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics
构建了一个竞选、选举与政策制定的新模型，区分了政党领袖的事前目标与当选议员的事后目标，揭示了多数决政治中存在的保护主义偏向，并分析了政党纪律对贸易政策的影响。
We develop a novel model of campaigns, elections, and policymaking in which the ex ante objectives of national party leaders differ from the ex post objectives of elected legislators. This generates a distinction between “policy rhetoric ” and “policy reality” and introduces an important role for “party discipline ” in the policymaking process. We identify a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics. When trade policy is chosen by the majority delegation and legislators in the minority have limited means to influence choices, the parties announce trade policies that favor specific factors, and the expected tariff or export subsidy is positive. Positions and expected outcomes monotonically approach free trade as party discipline strengthens.