The Value Relevance of Managers' and Auditors' Disclosures About Material Measurement Uncertainty
研究了管理层和审计师关于复杂估计的披露是否提供不同的价值相关信息，以及审计报告中的视觉提示如何影响非专业投资者的使用。
ABSTRACT Regulators now require auditors to provide information about how they evaluate complex estimates. Because users encounter this auditor-provided information alongside management-provided information, we jointly examine the value relevance of these disclosures. We also examine whether visual cues in audit reports influence how nonprofessional investors use these disclosures. We find that disclosures from managers and auditors provide different value-relevant information about the same underlying issue. While users struggle to weight fully narrative auditor disclosures in their valuation judgments without corresponding management disclosures, visual cues facilitate their weighting of information about the audit. Specifically, users take increased price protection when auditor disclosures also include visual cues. However, consistent with market signaling theory, corresponding voluntary disclosures from management attenuate this price protection. This suggests management can mitigate negative valuation effects that may arise from auditor disclosures, and implies that visual cues in audit reports can prompt managers to increase disclosure transparency. Data Availability: Contact the authors.