Pension Deficits and the Design of Private Debt Contracts
研究发现养老金赤字越大的企业，银行贷款成本越高，银行会要求更多抵押品、增加契约条款并缩短贷款期限，且这类企业未来更可能违约。
We find a positive relation between the amount of pension deficits and the cost of bank loans. The effect of pension deficits on the cost of bank loans is driven by financial constraints, information-asymmetry problems, and higher pension-investment risk. Banks tighten lending terms for firms with larger pension deficits by requiring collateral, increasing the number of loan covenants, and shortening loan maturity. Borrowers with larger pension deficits are also more likely to violate covenants in the future. Collectively, these findings indicate that pension deficits represent an additional source of risk priced by banks.