Nonlinear Pricing and the Market for Settling Payments
研究了Fedwire实时全额结算系统的递减区块定价方案，发现银行对平均价格而非边际价格做出反应，表明即时结算优势不大，降低最后区块成本可能无效。
Abstract Fedwire Funds is a real‐time gross settlement system that uses a decreasing block pricing scheme to attract nonurgent payments. A bank's optimal response to Fedwire's pricing depends on its perceived benefits to settling nonurgent payments quickly. If the urgency for immediate settlement is great enough, a bank responds to marginal price; otherwise, it responds to average price. We find banks respond to average price, suggesting that Fedwire's advantage over competing services of being able to provide immediate settlement is small. Moreover, attempts to increase demand for Fedwire services by lowering the cost of banks' final block of payments may be ineffective if there is not a corresponding decrease in average cost.