Ranking, Unemployment Duration, and Wages
研究企业按失业时间长短排序录用申请者这一假设对工资决定的影响，并与随机录用对比，发现该假设能解释1980年代欧洲失业者再就业前景更差的现象。
The paper examines the effects of the composition of unemployment on wage determination. It explores the implication of one central assumption: when firms receive multiple acceptable applications, they hire the worker who has been unemployed for the least amount of time. This assumption ("ranking") is contrasted with the assumption of random hiring ("no-ranking"). By embodying this assumption in a model of the labour market with job creation/destruction and matching, the joint behaviour of unemployment, the distribution of unemployment durations, and wages are characterized. The implication that the re-employment prospects of employed workers, were they to become unemployed, are better than those of the currently unemployed appears to have been an important feature of European unemployment experience in the 1980's. This paper examines the effects of the composition of unemployment on wage determina-tion. It explores one central assumption: when firms receive multiple acceptable applica-tions, they hire the worker who has been unemployed for the least amount of time. We refer to this assumption as "ranking " and contrast it throughout to the assumption of random hiring, or "no-ranking". By embodying this assumption in a model of the labour market with job creation/destruction and matching, we characterize the joint behaviour