Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action
研究了政府救济（如补偿、过渡安排）对事前激励和风险承担的影响，发现即使存在道德风险，政府救济也是低效的，因为它削弱了个人行为的后果。
A significant source of risk arises from uncertainty concerning future government policy. Government action - - tax reform, deregulation, judicial decisions, budgetary shifts - - produces gains and losses for those who invested under preexisting rules. The effects of government relief - - compensation, grandfathering, phase-ins - - on ex ante incentives and risk bearing are examined in a model in which private insurance is taken into account. It is demonstrated that government relief is inefficient, even when private insurance is subject to moral hazard, because relief shields individuals from some of the effects of their actions.