What Is the Price of Hubris? Using Takeover Battles to Infer Overpayments and Synergies
提出一个框架，利用收购战期间的股价变动来推断竞标者的超额支付和相对协同效应，并以1994年派拉蒙收购战为例，估计获胜方维亚康姆超额支付超过20亿美元，结果支持管理者过度自信或私人收益假说。
We present a framework for determining the information that can be extracted from stock prices around takeover contests.In only two types of cases is it theoretically possible to use stock price movements to infer bidder overpayment and relative synergies.The takeover contest for Paramount in 1994 illustrates one of these generic cases.We estimate that Viacom, the "winning" bidder, overpaid for Paramount by more than $2 billion.This occurred despite the fact that Viacom's CEO owned roughly 3/4 of Viacom.These results are consistent with managerial overconfidence and/or large private benefits, but not with the traditional agency-based incentive problem.