Outside and Inside Liquidity
研究了企业面临流动性需求时，如何选择现金储备（内部流动性）和出售资产（外部流动性）的组合，发现信息不对称可能导致过早清算，但延迟交易均衡反而更优。
We consider a model of liquidity demand arising from a possible maturity mismatch between asset revenues and consumption. This liquidity demand can be met with either cash reserves (inside liquidity) or via asset sales for cash (outside liquidity). The question we address is, what determines the mix of inside and outside liquidity in equilibrium? An important source of inefficiency in our model is the presence of asymmetric information about asset values, which increases the longer a liquidity trade is delayed. We establish existence of an immediate-trading equilibrium, in which asset trading occurs in anticipation of a liquidity shock, and sometimes also of a delayed-trading equilibrium, in which assets are traded in response to a liquidity shock. We show that, when it exists, the delayedtrading equilibrium is Pareto superior to the immediate-trading equilibrium, despite the presence of adverse selection. However, the presence of adverse selection may inefficiently accelerate asset liquidation. We also show that the delayed-trading equilibrium features more outside liquidity than the immediate-trading equilibrium although it is supplied in the presence of adverse selection. Finally, long term contracts do not always dominate the market provision of liquidity. We thank Rafael Repullo, Lasse Pedersen, Raghu Sundaram, and Doug Diamond as well as participants at